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THE TYRANNY OF 
TRANSPARENCY:
AUTO-IMMUNITY IN THE 
TEACHING MACHINE
Abstract: Th is article proposes that the 
prime ideals of the university – those of 
truth, knowledge, justice, and emancipa-
tion – are also those that currently produce
unjust practices “outside” (through aiding 
social stratifi cation) and “within” (through
internal hierarchies and exclusions). Us-
ing the work of Jacques Derrida and Paul 
Virilio, the article argues that the central 
problem of the university today consists not 
so much of a  neo-liberalisation, but of the
speeding-up of these ideals through their 
enmeshment with techniques of calculation,
vision, and prediction. Th e current univer-
sity therefore suff ers from what Derrida
identifi es as an “auto-immune disease,” in
which the acceleration of its foundational 
aspirations have led to a near-total subjuga-
tion of all and everything to an oppressive
quest for transparency. However, the article
proposes via Virilio that this totalising 
transparency paradoxically also produces
more blindness, accidents, and unknowa-
bility. It hopes to illustrate this with some
examples in the teaching scene as well by 
working through some of its own conceptual 
tensions. Th e other logic of the university 
today, the article fi nally proposes, consists
of a “dark” or stealth functionality, opening 
up the promise of a radically diff erent future
and unanticipated resistance despite itself.
Keywords: transparency; acceleration;
neoliberalism; humanism; auto-
immunity; teaching; university; vision
Tyranie transparentnosti: 
auto-imunita ve výukovém stroji
Abstrakt: Tato studie tvrdí, že hlavní ideály 
univerzity – pravda, poznání, spravedlnost 
a emancipace – zároveň produkují nespra-
vedlivé praktiky „vně“ (skrze prohlubování 
sociální stratifi kace) a „uvnitř“ (skrze interní 
hierarchie a exkluzi) univerzity. S využitím 
poznatků Jacquesa Derridy a Paula Virilia 
se článek zabývá důvody, proč klíčovým 
problémem současné univerzity není až tak 
neoliberalizace jako spíše zrychlování těchto 
ideálů skrze jejich popletenost s technikami 
kalkulace, vize a  predikce. Současná uni-
verzita tak trpí tím, co Derrida identifi kuje 
jako „auto-imunitní nemoc“, kdy zrychlo-
vání základních aspirací univerzity vede 
k  jejímu téměř totálnímu podrobení všech 
a všeho represivní snaze o transparentnost. 
Na pozdí práce Virilia však studie tvrdí, že 
tato totalizující transparentnost paradoxně 
produkuje více slepoty, nehod a nepoznatel-
nosti. Toto tvrzení se argumentace pokouší 
doložit jak na  příkladech z  pedagogického 
prostředí, ale i tak, že rozpracovává některé 
své vlastní koncepční tenze. Závěrem článek 
tvrdí, že „temno“ nebo též tajná funkčnost 
přestavuje druhou logiku dnešní univerzity, 
která navzdory sebe sama, otevírá příslib 
radikálně jiné budoucnosti a nepředvídatel-
ného odporu.
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zrychlení; neoliberalisms; humanismus;
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Whither the university?
From its fi rst words on, metaphysics associates sight with knowledge,
and knowledge with knowing how to learn and knowing how to teach.1
But perhaps we need some perspective, some perspective on perspective.2
Th e contemporary university in Europe fi nds itself, according to many criti-
cal commentators, the target of a widespread neo-liberalisation. Th is neo-
liberalisation, as part of a homogenisation of higher education in Europe, is 
implemented by member states by way of various mandates of the European 
Union, for instance the much-debated Bologna Process. Th ese mandates 
range from enabling student mobility within the Union to generating the 
opportunity for such a  student body to make an informed choice as to 
their potential programme and country of study. Such a neo-liberalisation 
therefore arguably not only seeks to render universities more productive in 
terms of research output and the formation of graduates capable of work-
ing in a  the current economic environment, but also seeks to hold them 
accountable via goals and outcome-oriented practices just like it would 
profi t-oriented business. In other words, it seeks to render the European 
university more transparent. Th is new form of accountability, which gets
vilifi ed by many of its opponents for many good reasons, can be especially 
noted in the various forms of calculation, quantifi cation, and metrifi cation 
around its internal practices, which claim to improve or pay more attention 
to the quality and effi  cacy of research and teaching. In the Dutch context for 
instance, teaching evaluations are exceedingly done via online forms that 
gather qualitative and statistical data about student satisfaction. Th is data 
in turn generates a score on a scale from one to fi ve on various pedagogical 
and organisational elements of the course, its location, and its lecturer. On 
the national scale, Dutch undergraduate and post-graduate programmes get 
a numerical grade via the so-called National Student Evaluation (“Nationale 
Studenten Enquête” or NSE), in which students fi ll out an online list of evalu-
ative queries in relation to the programme they attend or have attended. Th e 
NSE outcomes are presented in grade-like scores that curiously emulate the 
1 Jacques DERRIDA, “Th e Principle of Reason: the University in the Eyes of Its Pupils.” In: 
Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2004, p. 130.
2 Ryan BISHOP, Phantom Limbs of the Body Politic: Prosthesis, the University and the State
[online]. 2004. Available at: <http://www.lemmata.com> [cit. 10. 7. 2015], p. 14.
Some parts of this article are also forthcoming in my book Higher Education and Technological 
Acceleration. New York: Palgrave 2016.
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test-scores that students typically receive at Dutch universities, with grades 
ranging from 1 (abysmal) to 10 (perfect). Th is score in turn gets posted on 
the website of the department that off ers that programme in order to ensure 
optimal comparability, regardless of the wishes of that department.
Besides aiming to facilitate the choice of study and city for prospective 
students so that, as Graham Allen notes, the student is treated “as a client 
requiring a transparent and quality product,” the justifi cation of this Evalu-
ation is also to aid the qualitative perfection of these programmes.3 Th e NSE 
website for instance also claims that “objective information about universi-
ties, schools and their course programmes can be used to improve the qual-
ity of Dutch higher education.” “Student ratings,” the website continues, 
“give unique insights into students’ satisfaction with their higher education 
programmes. [...] Who better to rate a programme than the students who 
are already enrolled?”4 In other words, the number that the NSE generates 
for each department is assumed to be a more “objective” and democratically 
gathered score ‘directly’ coming from actual students, because the “noise” 
of all kinds of “excuses” by a programme and its staff  have been eradicated. 
Of course, and as many critics have pointed out, these types of evaluative 
practices are an outfl ow of the starkly consumer-oriented ideology that per-
vades the neoliberal economy as such, in which universities need to pay heed 
to what their present and future clientele needs or wants. Higher education 
hence seems to have been “downgraded” to a mere business among many 
businesses that casts its students as mere consumers of knowledge and skills. 
Th e result of this is that university staff  also fi nd themselves increasingly 
exposed to economistic pressures and rationales.
Th ose who decry these neoliberal transformations therefore suggest that 
the superior goals of the traditional university (beyond the merely econo-
mistic and practical ones) have been squandered under this new regime of 
neoliberal consumer and product-oriented managerialism. Moreover, they 
argue that this has a  detrimental eff ect on the quality, if not necessarily 
quantity, of research output and sound pedagogy. Th ese critical commenta-
tors – and I would like to state my sympathy, yet as will become clear later, 
not complete agreement with this group – lament the neoliberal university 
as one where the oppression of numbers trumps the necessarily unmesura-
3 Graham ALLEN, “Transparency and Teaching.” Th eory, Culture and Society, Problematizing 
Global Knowledge special issue, vol. 23, 2006, no. 2–3, p. 569 (568–570).
4 Studiekeuze123. “About the NSE,” [online]. 2016. Available at: <http://www.studiekeuze123.
nl/about-the-nse> [cit. 6-4-2016].
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ble quality of fundamental science and philosophy. Th ey conclude that the 
neoliberal university has become a place where professors and students are 
exploited by a management that is largely clueless about and even maliciously 
resistant to what is perceived as the “true” and more profound purpose of 
the university – that of independently pursuing justice, knowledge, truth, 
and emancipation. In “Th e Corporate University and the Politics of Educa-
tion” for instance, Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux lament the fact that 
higher education and business imperatives have become too intertwined, 
and insist that the university should remain an “autonomous sphere” by 
upholding the democratic values of “justice, freedom, and equality.”5
Understandably therefore, many who decry the university’s entry into 
the global market press for a return to the “old” independent university in 
order to counter its neo-liberalisation. In an interview by David Senior, me-
dia philosopher Siegfried Zielinski for instance “vehemently” pleads “that 
they [again] be able to proliferate as gleaming ivory towers. Study at the 
academy should be more than ever the off er of a protected time and space 
where original thoughts and ideas can be developed and tried out.”6 Like-
wise, in his short indictment “From Ivory Tower to Glass House,” former 
chairman of the Dutch Association of Universities Karl Dittrich chides the 
contemporary university for having lost its original independence, even if he 
considers the fact that universities are forced to be accountable to the public 
a  positive development.7 Such nostalgic notions of the “old” independent 
university are however, I would argue, extremely problematic. Th is is espe-
cially because the university was never truly independent at all, whether in 
terms of its organisation, administration, or intellectual “content.” In fact, 
many of the original theories, ideas, and regulations of the neoliberal market 
economy were fi rst and foremost developed by economists and philosophers 
with either an academic position or at least with a solid academic pedigree. 
One may think here for instance of Walter Eucken from the Freiburg School 
and Milton Friedman from the Chicago School, both of whom have devel-
oped the cornerstones of the neoliberal economy from within prominent 
universities. Likewise, as Ryan Bishop points out in “Phantom Limbs of the 
5  Stanley ARONOWITZ – Henry GIROUX, “Th e Corporate University and the Politics of 
Education.” Educational Forum, vol. 64, 2000, no. 4, p. 85.
6  Siegfried ZIELINSKI – David SENIOR, “Interview with Siegfried Zielinski,” [online]. 2006. 
Rhizome, Friday April 7. Available at: <http://rhizome.org/discuss/view/20967/> [cit. 30-8-
2015].
7  Karl DITTRICH, “Van Ivoren Toren naar Glazen Huis.” In: VERBRUGGE, A. – van 
BAARDEWIJK, J. (eds.), Waartoe Is de Universiteit op Aarde? Amsterdam: Boom 2014, p. 161.
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Body Politic,” the university has played “an integral, if almost silent role” 
in the development of all kinds of information-gathering technologies and 
engineering-oriented models of “noise cancellation” that typically came 
out of collaboration with military endeavours, and that have “pried open” 
the university in order to render it increasingly integrated in the global 
economy.8 Th e forerunner of the Internet (the ArpaNet) as well as the com-
putational systems and ideologies of “objectivity” and transparency that 
at base make possible something like the Dutch NSE, were thus developed 
by a  handful Western universities. Not unimportantly, they did this with 
the help of military monies whose interests were fi rmly tied up in global 
imperialism.
What is more (and lest we forget), the university has already since its 
“rebirth” in the European Renaissance period been entangled with a thor-
oughly classed, gendered, and imperialist ideology and functionality. Its 
teaching and research practices have over the last centuries primarily func-
tioned for the reproduction of local and global elites – a fact which can still 
be gathered from the general Euro- and American-centrism of the curricula 
of nearly all “reputable” or highly-ranked universities worldwide. In short, 
the borders between the State, the national and supra-national economy or 
industry, and the university, were also in the past much more permeable 
than the problematic notions of “ivory towers”, academic independence, or 
scientifi c objectivity suggest. Indeed then, the very argument for objectiv-
ity or independence, as I  will demonstrate later, may very well reproduce 
masculinist and Eurocentric ideology.
Either way, the peculiar case is that the university appears to “succumb” 
to those neoliberal theories and technologies of social selection and quanti-
fi cation that it at least in large part itself has brought forth. Th is means that 
it would be a mistake to understand a phenomenon like the new evaluative 
practices as signifying a mere “onslaught” by the neoliberal economy and 
the European Union from “outside” of the university walls. Th e analyses 
that partly mistake the problem of contemporary metrifi cation and account-
ability as stemming from a neo-liberalisation, I argue, then do not go deep 
enough into these complexities. Th is is fi rstly because they stop short of 
thinking through, as I will elaborate shortly, how the classical assumption 
of “knowledge production, consumption, and communication” has emerged 
from a dominant understanding of communication and vision in university 
teaching and research that has its roots in Western metaphysical concepts. 
8 BISHOP, Phantom Limbs, p. 13.
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Moreover, they turn a blind eye to how the fi nally unfi nishable (from Der-
rida’s usage of the French “inachevable”) humanist and Enlightenment 
ideals of the university get ever more quickly re-performed via ever-more so-
phisticated communication tools.9 Th is accelerated performance eventually 
also renders obvious the non-neutrality and violent outfl ows of those tools 
and of the university itself as a  result of their fundamental entanglement 
with Western humanistic and metaphysical ideals. Allow me to explain this 
in the next section by way of Jacques Derrida’s “Th e Principle of Reason: Th e 
University in the Eyes of Its Pupils.”
Th e “blind spot” of reason
Although the university has of course by no means been a static entity since 
its nascence in the European Medieval period, I propose that it is possible to 
trace back the contemporary obsession with transparency to certain domi-
nant notions that have always surrounded its concomitant founding and 
re-founding. In other words, the turns in the development of the university 
certainly concern a number of breaks and changes, but also contain some 
continuities. Th ese continuities, as will become clearer in the course of this 
article, circulate around ideals of vision, communication, and community 
within the European context. While I unfortunately have no space to go into 
detail for what this implies for each era of university change, these ideals 
for instance emerge in the Medieval university as the idea of God as the 
“all-seeing light” around which all persons are in their communal pursuits 
bound into one entity. Th e Renaissance university with its Enlightenment 
and humanist predispositions in turn constitutes not merely a throwback to 
early Greek models and practices around citizenship, but also to the Chris-
tian idea around light and moral uprightness. Th e Humboldtian university 
in turn reworked these themes to emphasise personal Bildung in service of 
the nation-state, while the contemporary university sees an intensifi cation 
of ideals around vision and community in light of a disintegration of the 
(fantasy of) the coherent nation-state and the ascendance of modern com-
munication tools.
It is for this reason of unaccounted continuities around vision and com-
munity, that naively nostalgic renditions of the university should be handled 
with care. Similarly arguing against the risk of erecting a  nostalgic “pro-
tectionist barrier” between the university and its alleged ‘outside,’ Jacques 
9  Jacques DERRIDA, Parrages. Paris: Éditions Galilée 1986, p. 116.
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Derrida suggest that the dominant ideals of the university fi nd their fi rst 
powerful yet problematic articulation in Aristotle’s defi nition of man as the 
rational animal in Metaphysics. Aristotle posits without reservation that 
“all men, by nature, have the desire to know,” because knowledge gathering 
creates a form of pleasure that points beyond the mere utility of knowledge. 
In turn, Aristotle suggest that especially the sensory experience of the eyes 
facilitates this pleasure of knowing, leading Derrida to conclude that the 
Enlightenment tradition that emerged from this peculiar Aristotelian state-
ment has a  “preference to sight just as ... [a] preference to the uncovering 
of diff erences.”10 Derrida thus illustrates how the association of knowledge
with vision that still dominates Western science and philosophy, is histori-
cally and culturally contingent.
However, Derrida immediately complicates any such straightforward 
connection between sight and knowledge. In order namely to refl ect on the 
knowledge thus gathered and in order to “listen better,” these eyes must 
also at times “close itself off  in the darkness of inward thought and sleep.”11
Th erefore, “the university,” stresses Derrida, “must not be a  sclerophthal-
mic animal, a hard-eyed animal [...] a dry glance that always sees,” as this 
would render impossible inward contemplation. Th is means that the uni-
versity, in order to keep generating “new” knowledge, by necessity needs 
darkness or a “blind spot” in its own internal functioning and destination. 
Since the generating of such a blind spot consists of (a  today increasingly 
high-tech) “diaphragm” that can “at regular intervals” narrow its sight, Der-
rida provocatively asks whether “the university [is] the master of its own 
diaphragm?”12 We will see later that the work of Paul Virilio addresses the 
issue of cybernetic technology and the university by suggesting that modern 
technologies of knowing and vision simultaneously seek to elucidate and 
suppress its “dark side.” Th ey do so in particular by rendering exceedingly 
obscure the memory of the grounds via which the illusion of objectivity 
is generated. For Derrida, since the principle of reason follows a  certain 
“rhythm” of opening and closing the eyes which cannot think its irrational 
grounds (since Aristotle’s defi nition is in the end indeed just a compelling 
story), it “installs its empire only to the extent that the abyssal question of 
the being that is hiding within it remain hidden.”13 Th is means that today, 
10 DERRIDA, “Th e Principle,” p. 130.
11 Ibid., p. 132.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 139.
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“this institution of modern techno-science that is the university Stift ung is
built both on the principle of reason and on what remains hidden in that 
principle.”14 Th is “dissimulation of its origin” is therefore productive insofar 
it requires that the techno-sciences incessantly cover over the fact that there 
exists no pure reason or seeing through ever-more sophisticated techniques
of seeing as suppression. “Computer technology, data banks, artifi cial intel-
ligence, translating machines, and so forth,” says Derrida, “all have to be 
pondered as the eff ect of the principle of reason, or, more rigorously, as 
a dominant interpretation of this principle.”15
Th e argument that I am pursuing, namely that what is called the neo-
liberalisation of the university is in fact an acceleration, intensifi cation, and 
displacement of the ideals of the university by techniques developed by itself, 
is also brought up in Derrida’s “Mochlos.” In this piece, Derrida dramati-
cally proclaims “Th e university, what an idea! It is a relatively recent idea. We 
have yet to escape it, and it is already being reduced to its own archive...”16
I am presenting a brief discussion of this text to further illuminate the play 
between light and dark at the heart of the university by Derrida, who at the 
same time seems keenly aware of how this reproduces the ideal by “illumi-
nating” such a problem. I would like to note here that the “problem” of the 
“philosophical illumination of a problem” produces an unresolvable tension 
my article is also caught in. Th e Greek term mochlos (μοχλός) in Derrida’s 
title translates as “lever” or “keystone,” which therefore already implies, 
as Dittrich also hinted at, that there resides a “confl ict” at the heart of the 
university that also constitutes its central mechanism. Derrida’s suggestion 
here immediately sidesteps the nostalgia around the correct function or 
responsibility of the university. Th is is because he stresses that this confl ict, 
“breach,” or incoherence has always been present in various more or less 
violent forms – the elitist institutionalization of the classic Bildungsideal
being one of them. Meanwhile, idealistic representations like Humboldt’s si-
multaneously functioned as a cover for the university’s essential impurity.17
But such an obfuscation, Derrida suggests, cannot last, as the university’s 
aim is just as much one of universal uncovering or transparency; its quest 
remains to render everything knowable in the service of some greater good. 
14 Ibid., p. 140.
15 Ibid., p. 146.
16  Jacques DERRIDA. “Mochlos, or: Th e Confl ict of the Faculties.” In: RAND, R. (ed.), 
Logomachia: Th e Confl ict of the Faculties, London: University of Nebraska Press 1992, p. 1.
17 Ibid., p. 7.
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Th is means that this obfuscation at some point will have to come to light as 
well.
Th e university therefore, according to Derrida, seeks to be responsible by 
means of its incessantly revealing function, and has historically performed 
that responsibility through great Enlightenment concepts like “the state, 
the sovereign, the people, knowledge, truth,” and so forth.18 Th ese concepts,
while incessantly re-performed and chanted today via the anti-neoliberal 
activism of various academic staff  and students, essentially gesture towards 
an abstraction or an absent addressee. “Th e truth,” like ‘the people’ or “the 
students,” is aft er all a  fantasized universal, whereas its actualization is 
marked by heterogeneity, projection, and fragmentation. And this was al-
ways already the case: indeed, Derrida says that in the past, or in a certain 
idealized representation of that past, “one could at least pretend to know 
whom one was addressing, and where to situate power.”19 It is this abstrac-
tion that constitutes, according to Derrida, the university’s utopian potential 
as a continuous crisis of legitimation. Trying to close off  that uncertainty 
of the validity of its project thus marks the ascendance of yet another crisis 
that is thoroughly imbricated with crises of the State, of metaphysics, and of 
technology.20 Derrida’s sentiment echoes Jean-François Lyotard’s analysis in 
Th e Inhuman, in which the latter describes the current state of science and 
philosophy. Th e justifi cation for these endeavours has according to Lyotard 
historically been “dressed up in all sorts of disguises: destination of man, 
reason, enlightenment, emancipation, happiness.” He concludes that these 
now appear “naked. More and more power, yes – but why, no.”21
I concur that it is due to this contemporary “nakedness” of the “why” of 
the university that the sympathetic and useful Aristotelian slogan “knowl-
edge for knowledge’s sake” which is oft en heard in the Dutch university 
debate against neo-liberalisation, is foundational as well as misleading. Th e 
challenge of the contemporary university rather, I suggest, lies once more in 
its thinking about – and never quite being able to answer or resolve – what 
its responsibility consists of. Indeed, Derrida suggests from the outset that 
everything revolves around the problem of accountability of and for a com-
munity, in which neither what to account for, nor who constitutes the “we” of 
this community, nor even the exact where of this accountability can be locat-
18 Ibid., p. 4.
19 Ibid., p. 3, italics mine.
20 Ibid., p .4.
21  Jean-François LYOTARD, “Time Today.” In: Th e Inhuman: Refl ections on Time. Cambridge:
Polity 1991, p. 54, italics mine.
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ed.22 Th ere is then in this shadow-play always a more originary or “younger” 
responsibility to be had, dislocating the seemingly-solid “old” one.23 Th is re-
sponsibility cannot run through the “decision of a pure ego-logical subject” 
who consciously and intentionally makes “minor adjustments de rigueur and 
daily compromises lacking in rigor,” because it is such a subject of intention 
who merely responds to an institutional law with the aims of making him-
self a “survivor” within that institution.24 Derrida makes a clear reference to
a certain acceleration, when he chides not only a survivalist socio-economic 
discourse, but also the narrowing of the university’s imagination. He does so 
by condemning superfi cial changes and stale protocols as merely leading to 
a situation in which the university intellectual or administrator “operating 
at top speed [...] accounts and becomes accountable for nothing: not for what 
happens, not for the reasons to continue assuming responsibilities without 
a concept.”25
One could read this as a call for a slowing down and taking stock, how-
ever urgently; and more particularly as an indictment of the ways in which 
continuous over-production is fundamentally entangled with the neoliberal 
techniques that make this possible. One may think here of the steep rise in 
academic publications and journals, the overwhelming number of exams and 
amount of marking, the increase in global conference and research travel, 
and the debilitating emphasis on performance indicators. Yet acceleration is 
not the university’s only problem, nor will deceleration solve the question of 
accountability. What is more namely, due to the slippery nature of academic 
responsibility, Derrida implies that it is only logical that the “factory-like” 
properties of the university, in which the production of knowledge is treated 
“like an industry” (Derrida refers here to the words of Immanuel Kant), will 
have to slide towards an exceeding quantifi cation. Digital technologies are 
then roped in to help make sense of and organize the huge amount of new 
information and the ever larger student body. Such a  quantifi cation, says 
Derrida, while seeking to render the university transparent and accountable, 
becomes exceedingly irresponsible insofar it exacerbates the essentially “the-
atrical representation” of the imagined autonomy of the university by way 
of delegating it increasingly to a cybernetic machinery designed to close off  
radical alterity.26 In other words, while the criteria for academic competence
22  DERRIDA, “Mochlos,” p. 1.
23 Ibid., p. 6.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., italics mine.
26 Ibid., p. 3.
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and performance were in the past seemingly independent (via peer-reviews 
and lecturer relative autonomy) but actually enmeshed with a patriarchal and 
Eurocentric politics of the State, such a politics and its criteria for evaluation 
are now thoroughly enmeshed with the technologies of global acceleration 
and simulation. Derrida on this point echoes Lyotard’s analysis of the ways 
in which knowledge becomes a product of technological power in Th e Post-
modern Condition. Lyotard here notes that academic performativity, besides
being “theatrical,” also entails the “output of a technical system, a place where 
knowledge and power are no longer distinguished.”27 It is therefore “the 
publication of knowledge” or the communication and dissemination of ideas 
that fi nds itself in “a double-bind, a demand [...] intrinsically in confl ict with 
itself” as communicating more ultimately amounts to communicating less.28
I  take from Derrida that it is ultimately the quest for universal knowledge 
and community as the hallmark of the university, that has also birthed its 
entanglement with “objectifying” techniques of formalization and quantifi -
cation. Here too, the acceleration of scientifi c objectivity and independence 
as a  philosophical ideal has become displaced – that is, its meaning and 
logic have shift ed – into the objectifying techniques of the cybernetic and 
neoliberal machinery. Th e argument for autonomy therefore paradoxically 
has spawned its slippage into an irresponsible rationalization that seeks to
stabilize the university project in an extremely problematic fashion.
I therefore propose that the university today suff ers from a heightened 
auto-immune disease, and that this disease has been lingering in its core 
principles. I  transpose the term auto-immunity from Derrida’s “Autoim-
munity: Real and Symbolic Suicides” in which he shows how state terrorism 
breeds anti-state terrorism.29 Jean Baudrillard echoes this insight, stating 
that at the heart of every system there resides a  logic of “reversibility;” 
a “blind spot” which consists of “something unaccountable for itself, ines-
capable but also indecipherable, an immanent type of fatality [...] a type of 
objective irony.”30 Particularly today then, the technological acceleration of 
27 Jean-François LYOTARD, Th e Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester:
Manchester University Press 1984, p. 12.
28  DERRIDA, “Mochlos,” p. 12.
29  Jacques DERRIDA – Giovanna BORRADORI, “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides
– A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida.” In: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2003, p. 85.
30  Jean BAUDRILLARD, “Th e Revenge of the Crystal. An Interview by Guy Bellavance.” In: 
Revenge of the Crystal: Selected Writings on the Modern Object and Its Destiny, 1968–1983.
London: Pluto Press 1990, p. 17.
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the neoliberal economy brings the university’s auto-immunity ever more to 
the foreground. Th is leads to an aggravation of its fundamental tensions. So 
there is a historical continuity of auto-immunity in the university project all 
the way from its aspirational beginnings that persists today, even if that con-
tinuous element has seen various turns, and has now been displaced towards 
the imperatives of productivity, “free-market” ideals, and effi  ciency. Espe-
cially the laudable goals of emancipation, truth, and freedom in research 
and teaching, have themselves from the their idealistic beginnings in the 
Renaissance already been tainted by the demons of oppression, falsehood, 
and exclusion. Th e fundamental tension in its project – that what Dittrich 
calls its “immanent contradiction”31 – that led to (the illusion of) progress 
through scientifi c and philosophical research and technological innovation, 
has now become “productive” primarily in the economic sense. Th e eff ect is 
that today, at the heart of the university lies an aporia that expresses itself,
in a curious reversal of its values and stakes, as a “naked” pretence or hy-
pocrisy. Th is leads so-called “knowledge workers” at many contemporary 
universities to fi nd themselves confronted with contradictory feelings and 
schizoid situations. Examples of this are teaching students the ills of social 
hierarchisation through education, while also sorting them in hierarchical 
(alpha)numerical slots according to academic performance – a practice that 
indeed has boomeranged back to the Dutch universities via the logic of the 
NSE. Th e university is therefore the one location in the current economy 
where the basic confl icting duplicity following the exacerbation of its apo-
retic ideals is most keenly felt, leading to high levels of stress. Sadly though, 
this auto-immunity gets oft en suppressed or internalized by many such
“workers” and students as either personal failure or a general incompatibil-
ity with its institutional demands.
Transparency in the teaching scene
To summarise, my proposition is that the prime missions or ideals of the
university as most of us today understand them, and which especially came
out of Enlightenment humanism –emancipation, truth, freedom, justice, and
knowledge – are precisely what currently produce exceedingly unjust practices
“outside” and “within” universities. Th ese unjust practices “outside” concern
ongoing social stratifi cation via so-called “meritocratic” education and
sociological, computational, and psychological objectifi cation of ever more 
31 DITTRICH, “Van Ivoren Toren,” p. 160.
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cultures and groups. Meanwhile, the unjust practices “inside” concern those 
of internal hierarchies, rankings, evaluations, divisions, gatekeeping mecha-
nisms, and exclusions of all kinds. It may be useful to recall at this stage 
that the term “university” originally designated the Medieval “corporation,” 
which etymologically comes from the Latin una or “one.” Th e Latin universi-
tas therefore at base means “turned into one entity,” designating a “totality” 
or “total community.”32 Th e current university and its new forms of violence
are therefore an outfl ow or intensifi cation of “outdated” humanist ideals and 
techniques that are remobilised by neoliberal capitalism and its machinery 
of acceleration for their own totalising quest. In other words, the hopeful 
academic project of “exposing the world and humanity to the light of truth 
and emancipation,” together with its “evil twins” of oppressive universal-
ism, social submission, surveillance, and colonialism, have caved in onto 
themselves and become a  near-pervasive technologically “exposing-itself” 
of a  fundamentally duplicitous contemporary academic institution. And 
because the reproduction of its practices at base involve modern techniques 
of knowing, this article suggests that rather than arguing for a return to the 
“walled” university (however sympathetic), gaining a better understanding 
of the intersection of this problematic with modern technologies of commu-
nication, visibility, or calculation, is crucial to really thinking the modern 
university project diff erently.
Th e relationship between academia and modern technology therefore 
consists of a  more fundamentally entangled apparatus than most critics 
of the neo-liberalisation of higher education consider it to be. Many such 
critics see technology or media as merely applied onto the university from 
the “outside” or as mere tools for use on the “inside.” Th e problem of the 
problematic evaluative practices via course evaluations or via the NSE none-
theless stretches well beyond a neoliberal encroachment, and return also in 
fi elds seemingly unrelated to cybernetics. Let me give an example of how 
some authors forget how also the humanities are just as much part of the 
problem. Steven Ward for instance helpfully claims that the digital knowl-
edge economy, due to the translation of information into bits and bytes, has 
forced a  quantifi cation of performance indicators in academia, leading to 
the erasure of certain kinds of knowledge33 Especially the humanities, says 
32  Eric PARTRIDGE, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English. London: 
Routledge 1963, p. 452.
33  Steven WARD, Neoliberalism and the Global Restructuring of Knowledge and Education.
New York: Routledge 2012, p. 126.
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Ward, with their ways of communicating knowledge (like the monograph) 
that cannot be reduced to sheer numbers, suff er from this quantifi cation. 
Th is is true whether books are disaggregated into sellable pieces, or made to 
follow the impetus of fast-paced output.34 While I agree with Ward on this 
aspect of digitalization, he does not consider the fact that the origins of digi-
tal technologies, as I mentioned earlier, stem from university research. What 
is more, he forgets that the technologies of communication and visualization 
have always been part of the university setup from its Renaissance inception 
in Europe. One may here think for example of René Descartes’ mechanistic 
view of the material world, the crucial importance of inventions like the 
telescope and microscope, or the ways in which the dissemination of stories 
and ideas relied on book printing technology. It appears then that the basic 
imbrication of academia with media technologies is one of a  continuous 
and ever-growing constitutional yet dialectical relationship, in which these 
technologies eventually turn out to be much more than a  means through 
which research and teaching is carried out. Instead, due to their constitutive 
enmeshment with academia’s auto-immunity, they expose themselves as 
facilitators as well as thwarters of the academic ideal of total knowledge. Th e
ideals of exposition and omniscience, and the ways these are today carried 
out through modern data-driven technologies and visual media aids, is itself 
just as ambiguous and ungraspable.
In other words, the current push for predictability and transparency 
aggravates the tensions immanent to the university project. Th is occurs 
especially in places where the university’s promise towards justice, a democ-
racy-to-come, or a radically diff erent future, clashes with the (ir)responsible 
demand to render the outcomes of this promise measurable. Nowhere 
do  such tensions emerge most obviously in the contemporary classroom, 
where all kinds of measures that seek to cater to predictable outcomes and 
learning goals desperately seek to contain and stratify a by defi nition uncon-
tainable situation. In its idealised depiction aft er all, learning is and should 
be always more than a mere “transmission” of knowledge. Derrida explicates 
this point by noting with Nietzsche that apparently “Th e more one does in 
the area of training, the more one has to think.” He hereby refers once more 
to the fact that the contemplation of knowledge gathered via the principle of 
reason by the necessity involves seeing and darkness, lest the university not
be “sclerophthalmic.”35 As Graham Allen likewise provocatively asks, “can
34 Ibid., p. 127.
35  DERRIDA, “Th e Principle,” p. 152.
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teaching, the thing that, since philosophy began in the West seems to have 
to do  with irony and subterfuge, doubles and deceit, power and betrayal, 
ever survive in a culture of consensus, perpetual peace and transparency?”36
Allen posits this question with an eye on the implementation of the Bologna 
Process in European universities, which sought to render teaching across 
Europe and the globe to be “comparable, measurable and calculable.” Th is 
attempt at comparability, says Allen, is an outfl ow of the practical but also 
ethical impetus towards “quality, excellence, freedom of information and 
transparency”37 – an impetus that I  have throughout suggested emerges
from the foundational ideals of the university. Excellence, or in ancient 
Greek arète (ἀρετή), aft er all already inhabited the ideal of moral character 
building that many centuries later re-emerged in the Humboldtian notion 
of Bildung. “Excellence” is thus one of those ideals that has been accelerated
and displaced via the notion of the upward citizen of the State towards the 
economically productive individual as the prime moral goal under globali-
sation. Moreover, freedom of information, as we saw with Derrida, has been 
intimately tied to metaphysical notions around the university community 
accumulating and disseminating knowledge for the illumination and salva-
tion of mankind, as well as the total comprehension of the universe at large. 
Due to the aporetic quality of such ideals, the teaching scene will also thwart 
what Allen ominously calls “the danger of universities in Europe collapsing 
into an integrated hall of mirrors, capable of reproducing the same student, 
the same degree, and the same knowledge at previously unimaginable 
speeds.” Th erefore, Allen notes that while transparency is “in principle 
a force against confl ict [...] one of the things which threatens to complicate 
the model of a  unifi ed, fl exible, calculable, transferable European higher 
education area, comes in the form of teaching itself.”38
An example of how this hopeful complication emerges in the teaching 
scene is how, in the Dutch context, university departments seek to heed stu-
dents’ and managers’ demands for more transparency in teaching. I would 
like to stress here that this example is not meant so much as empirical evi-
dence for my claims, but as an illustration of the university’s auto-immune 
disease. Th e Department of Media and Culture at the Humanities Faculty at 
Utrecht University in the Netherlands for instance did so by implementing 
the requirement that end goals and methods are made explicit in module 
36 ALLEN, “Transparency and Teaching,” p. 569.
37 Ibid., p. 568.
38 Ibid., p. 569.
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syllabi and student theses as much as possible, and that courses are to 
focus on the transmission of defi nable skills rather than “obscure theory.” 
But while such attempts at transparency are seemingly generous to the 
students, they ultimately serve to divorce methods and skills from their 
grounding theoretical perspectives. Th e etymology of the term “method” 
namely points towards the core Greek word όδος (“road”), generating the 
meaning of a  ‘higher road’ when combined with the Greek μέτα (“aft er, 
over”). A  μέθοδος is therefore literally a  designated way or means of do-
ing something, and in the research context has segued into meaning the 
“pursuit of knowledge.”39 Methods can therefore be understood as handy 
roadmaps for research, but are always specifi c to a certain theoretical tradi-
tion and hence can always be questioned for their specifi city. Th e emphasis 
on prescribed methods thus seems to arise from a fear of an unpredictable 
and unmeasurable slippage between institutional knowledge and student’s 
(or staff ’s) appropriations of such knowledge. It hence today appears as an 
attempt to stamp out the “noise” emanating from what Lyotard famously 
called the “end of grand narratives” in the West and relative loss of global 
hegemony by Europe as sketched in Th e Postmodern Condition.
Th is obsession with methods can also be interpreted as akin to cyber-
netic quantifi cation, which futilely seeks to disentangle the complications 
of thinking-as-dialectical in the university at large from the larger context 
of neoliberal acceleration which this cybernetic machinery serves. Most 
student work in turn increasingly resembles an immoral – because blind to 
its reproduction of inequalities – form of automated production and an ever 
more hastily churning-out of essays at this Department. Student theses for 
instance, having to bow to the demands of a standardised assessment form 
in which supposedly crucial aspects of the thesis are presented as separate 
entities, become narrow “assembly-line” write-ups that merely seek to “tick 
the boxes” without any critical or holistic considerations around rhetoric 
and perspective. For instance, the method employed needs to be rendered 
explicit and is separated in the form from the theoretical framework. More 
disturbingly, students that attempt a more daring piece of writing for their 
theses run the risk of getting penalised when not explicitly stating the 
method employed, even if management desperately claims that the form is 
not meant to be prescriptive.
Th is well-meant yet deplorable practice is therefore reminiscent of 
the “factory-like” disciplining of the student (and the lecturer) that Der-
39  PARTRIDGE, Origins, p. 449.
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rida warns for. Th e compulsory transparency of goals and methods leads 
to a  situation that becomes blind to how the outcome of the pedagogical 
student-teacher relationship should and indeed can never be fully known 
in advance, because it concerns a  scene of learning and transformation 
within as well as in tension with the cybernetic compulsion of the neoliberal 
economy. In other words, if the pedagogical scene wishes to be as hospitable 
and promissory as possible so that the student can “truly grow,” it follows 
that actual module goals remain partly oblique and emergent. Methods and 
indeed theories too, in order to heed to the founding call for illumination, 
should always be questioned and unpacked for their partial (oft en European 
and masculine) theoretical underpinnings and traditions. Aft er all, the term 
“theory” is derived from the Greek words θεωρειν and θεωρος meaning 
respectively “to look at” and “observer”. Etymologically, the term is con-
nected to being an spectator of a  play as well as an observer of religious 
activities, tying the idea of observation to the perspective of the gods.40 In
the Athenian context, being a  spectator or observer in the context of the 
theatre, in which the problems of the polis were addressed, in turn cemented
the spectator’s position as a legal part of the citizenry.41 Th e term “theory”
hence implies not only a partial position and particular perspective (or an-
gle) within a decidedly theatrical setting, but also an element of connection 
within a supposedly circumscribed legal scene or community. Th e formula-
tion of strict methods is therefore one particular instance of a problematic 
transcendence via a  dissimulation of the non-neutral grounds of theory. 
Baudrillard likewise suggests that the crucial aspect of teaching does not 
reside in the assumedly transparent communication of knowledge and re-
quirements, when he muses that “the communicational process has always 
seemed to me a little too functional [...] as if things always exist in relation to 
content, be it pedagogical or moral. I do not believe that the really important 
stakes exist at the level of communication.”42 Instead, in the relation between 
teacher and student, says Baudrillard, “something else happens: a  form of 
challenge, seduction, or play, which brings more intense things into being.”43
Th e modern teaching scene therefore showcases the auto-immunity that 
results from the university’s ideals of social progress and transformation. 
Th is is because the imperative that the scene be one of “true growth” for the 
40 Ibid., p. 470.
41  Jean-Pierre VERNANT – Pierre VIDAL-NAQUET, “Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek 
Th eatre.” In: Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece. New York: Zone Books 1990, p. 34.
42  BAUDRILLARD, “Th e Revenge,” p. 25.
43 Ibid., p. 24.
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student and society appears to be intimately connected with its “opposite” in 
the form of a stifl ing cybernetic production-line.
Th e faculty examination board at Utrecht, anxiously trying to ward off  
any “noise,” thus seeks to remain accountable, while failing to understand 
that the end-goal of the humanities is also one of questioning and critiquing 
all forms of non-neutral automation in order to invite a radically diff erent 
future. Indeed, following Derrida, this “dark” aspect of learning remains 
crucial to the teaching scene, so that again the Department fails to resolve 
the question of what its responsibility consists of. And while this generates 
a  lot of stress, this is also somehow for the better. Th e acceleration of the 
university’s aporia are nonetheless keenly felt around these pedagogical 
demands from management in my personal teaching experiences at Utre-
cht University. An increasingly unsure student body demand being taught 
ever clearer “methods” and “skills,” while at the same time, some students 
become ever more self-doubting and even recalcitrant, being unsure how to 
properly understand their own fears and doubts as a logical product of the 
aporetic or hypocritical demands the university and the lecturer makes on 
them. Also, the rendering transparent of methods and goals while eliding 
the intricacies underlying them has in many cases the paradoxical outcome 
of making the students understand less. Th is is because they cannot compre-
hend (and lecturers cannot exhaustively defend) why all the great texts of the 
humanities tend not to have an explicit methods section, while they have to 
explicate methods in their theses. Eventually therefore, any totalitarian at-
tempt at complete transparency does the students and the staff  a disservice, 
even if it seems to dutifully cater to their needs.
Th e violence of accelerated illumination
Th e analysis of the enmeshment of cybernetic techniques and academic 
excellence as products of an “objectifying” accountability of the current 
university staff  and student community, allows us to locate the problem of 
the university in its foundational ideological and moral outlook. In the last 
section, I will attempt to “burn up” the ideals and technologies of the univer-
sity by near-religiously overstating their eff ects via the work of philosopher 
of technology Paul Virilio. Oft en chided for his negativity or alarmism, 
Virilio’s writing exhibits that the obsession for transparency leads to opaque 
work. His position can best be summarized as someone who thinks through 
the eff ects and accidents (which can be disastrous as well as fortuitous) of the 
near-religious pushing of technologies of speed and light from a phenomeno-
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logical perspective. His work therefore, I suggest, emulates and parallels the 
near-militaristic yet unpredictable outcomes of the teaching scene, of which 
the transformative character of reading a provocative book like his can be 
an instant. Virilio not merely analyses but demonstrates the violence done
by the under-thought eff ects of modern technologies as especially a result of 
their military applications. Famously stating in an interview with James Der 
Derian that “War was my university; everything came out of that,” Virilio’s 
work needs to be understood in terms of a bringing to the fore the negativity 
of totalitarian techniques, both rhetorical and computational.44
Central to Virilio’s thought is an appreciation, contra Aristotle’s concep-
tion of essential versus accidental properties, of so-called accidental eff ects as 
essential to any technology. Digital military technologies of calculation (or 
cybernetics) increase the propensity for incalculable and catastrophic eff ects
parallel to the increase of their controlling and predictive powers. As is oft en 
the case with critical theory’s revelations also lying on the rhetorical level of 
the work, the ways in which Virilio’s prose bedazzles and confuses by way 
of a rapid concatenation of brilliantly personal observations and historical 
anecdotes, at times even in full caps, can be understood to imitate not only 
rapid-fi re modern military technologies, but also the relentless rhythms of 
the modern media and institutional demands. His point – and also mine – is 
therefore to purposely provoke in the academic reader a reaction of resist-
ance to totalitarianisms.
While Virilio has never explicitly written on the university as a modern 
institution thoroughly wrapped up in the logic of rapid-fi re and spectacular 
targeting, his work on the “logistics of perception” lends itself to compre-
hending this institution as today consisting of an accident of itself that
likewise bedazzles and confuses staff  and students. A point in case would 
again be the compulsion to the increasingly rapid-fi re production of articles 
and books, as well as the ways in which staff  and students exceedingly fi nd 
themselves the targets of a technocratic machinery. So while also his book 
titled Th e University of Disaster tells us nothing overtly about the modern 
university as such, the book title implies that the actual contemporary uni-
versity is an institution exceedingly failing to contain its own ever-growing 
disastrous or negative aspect – its autoimmune disorder. I suggest that we 
may read such an interpretation of the university’s duplicity especially via 
44  James DER DERIAN, “Global swarming and the Bosnia Question.” In: Virtuous War:
Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment-Network. New York: Routledge 2009, 
p. 64.
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Virilio’s Th e Vision Machine, as here once again the book title, together with
the analysis it makes of the infl uence of digital technologies on thought and 
perception, provides an excellent allegory of the central idea of technological 
“illumination” propelling universities past and present forward.
Moreover, this allegory (or arrogance) of the modern university as 
a “vision machine” has over the years become much more than a mere al-
legory; instead, the term “vision machine” also illustrates a crucial aspect 
of its current fl awed functioning as “teaching machine.” Th is is because, 
as I discussed earlier, mechanic and especially digital technologies have to 
a large extent enmeshed the university’s ideational and functional spheres. 
Th is is moreover a conjunction that also increasingly aff ects a large section 
of society (for instance via the so-called “social” media.) Since the univer-
sity’s ideals have in the past remained productive and quasi-stable because 
the aporia at its heart was constantly covered over or projected outside of 
itself, the technological organisation of the university today becomes one 
of intense internal contradiction and stealth logic. Th is is because, as Der-
rida also hinted at, its acceleration renders the disingenuous projection 
of its aporia as outside itself more and more tenuous by revealing it as its
internal logic. So its delusional game is increasingly diffi  cult to keep up; its 
hypocrisy, which Humboldt managed to temporarily ward off  via the false 
idea of academic neutrality and coherent community, now has gained full 
force. Th is is so much so that to still believe in its baseline emancipatory and 
progressive function appears exceedingly deluded. Th is delusion occurs as 
university staff  and students keep compulsively performing this belief until 
the point of exhaustion, burn-out, and self-blame, which I also noticed with 
students during their methods-confounded thesis trajectories. But as with 
so many individualized disorders, the diagnosis of rampant burn-out and 
self-blame actually points towards the structural exhaustion of a university 
project that is in the clutches of a disorder mirroring the structural crises of 
neoliberal capitalism.
Allow me to extrapolate from Virilio’s analysis of perceptual technolo-
gies towards this auto-immunity of the modern university today by walking 
through his argument in Th e Vision Machine. I note in passing that I un-
derstand the term “vision” to encompass all forms of knowledge gathering. 
Th is extension of vision can be made, as I argued earlier via Derrida, because 
vision has since Aristotle been assumed to be the superior sense or indeed 
faculty, even if he also illustrates that this connection to vision is eventu-
ally reliant on other senses. Th e term “faculty” of course perfectly connects 
the idea of the hierarchically organised manifold of human senses with the 
Ingrid M. Hoofd
107
notion of multiple faculties in the academic institution. Interestingly of 
course, we can discern in the idea of “vision” as complete understanding 
and superior knowledge in the “irrational” or faith-based origin of the uni-
versity project, since the Christian theme of God as all-seeing and radiant 
light grounds the belief in unmediated access from its inception. For Virilio 
then, seeking to be loyal to a  more “originary Christian responsibility”, 
to force the ideal of illumination into a  mechanistic materialization via 
various vision technologies constitutes nothing less than a corruption of our 
phenomenological condition. Th is is because such a forced mechanization 
disregards and even seeks to purge the necessarily unknowable or mythical 
aspect of experience and thought together with the necessarily communitar-
ian aspect of moral relations. Besides this couching of his argument about 
the ethical impact of such mechanization as resultant from such Christian 
sensibilities (and it behoves us to recall that Virilio has been much engaged 
in helping the French underclasses), Virilio’s argument in the fi rst chapter of 
Th e Vision Machine is based on the philosophy of Henri Bergson regarding 
the fundamental necessity of duration for consciousness and perception. 
Th is temporal element of sense for Virilio means importantly that “speed 
thereby becomes the causal idea, idea before the idea.” He hereby suggests 
that the technological acceleration of perception must necessarily infl uence 
what still can and increasingly cannot be thought; in short, speed starts to 
ground and limit all knowledge.45
Early vision machines like the telescope and the microscope thus remap 
the relation between the body and its surroundings, so that whatever was 
‘seen’ became standardized and disconnected – and hence generalizable – 
from the physical agency of certain dispossessed human populations and 
individuals.46 It is at this historical stage of the fi rst such vision machines
that Virilio locates the emergence of a “logistics of perception” as a form of 
“spectacular” propaganda at fi rst used by the Catholic Church and military 
institutions, in turn leading to colonization and labour exploitation.47 Th is
propagandistic function was possible because of the resultant agentic dis-
empowerment of the local and colonial non-elites. But it was also possible 
because the disconnection between seeing and the body and the bypass-
ing of duration resulted in an ongoing loss of memory, of the diversity of 
45 Paul VIRILIO, Th e Vision Machine. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1994, p. 3.
46 Ibid., p. 7.
47 Ibid., p. 5.
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mental images, and of imagination in general.48 I suggest that this argument 
connects to how Humboldt’s university suppressed the imagination of the 
general populace outside the university, both locally and in the colonies 
overseas, by rendering them the site of “dirty” and “uninformed” politics 
– a  populace that supposedly needs to be enlightened and emancipated. 
Virilio in turn locates a  particular kind of acceleration at the recent his-
torical instant where the early vision machines, which main ingredient was 
“the speed of light,” transformed into those early digital technologies that 
also use “the light of speed” or electronically or fi bre-optically generated 
simulations. Th is more modern acceleration, designating the “use of light 
stimuli in crowd control,” in turn has resulted in what he calls “a  sort of 
precocious disability, a blindness.”49 Today we then fi nd ourselves in what he 
terms the “zero degree of representation” where digital technologies appear 
to represent “reality” by absolutely obscuring or dissociating it from our 
lived reality. Th e latter aft er all only gains meaning by way of our embodied 
and duration-based imagination. It is here that we can also situate Lyotard’s 
claim of the end of grand narratives as in fact the moment where the lack of 
imaginative and mnemonic force renders all signs meaningless or relative 
except for the dominant “automated” ideology of technological objectivity.50
Virilio in turn suggests in the second chapter of Th e Vision Machine that 
there is a  dialectical relationship between the arts and the sciences. Both 
are namely involved in a kind of interplay as long as they presuppose their 
fundamental context of “prime ignorance” and the necessity of unknowa-
bility or of the mythical for research. Likewise, since “for the human eye 
the essential is invisible” so that “since everything is an illusion, it follows 
that scientifi c theory, like art, is merely a way of manipulating illusions.”51
Th e moment that scientifi c research or philosophical enquiry gets caught 
up in a totalisation of knowledge via the near-perfect mechanisation of vi-
sion or postulation of total objectivity, this dialectical play between the arts 
and the sciences gets eroded. With this ongoing “depersonalization of the 
thing observed but also of the observer,” we thus enter the era of what Virilio 
calls “the paradoxical logic” of the image. In this era, near-total illumina-
tion, while presenting itself as a democratisation, in fact signals the end of 
public representation in all its radical diversity.52 Virilio further illustrates
48 Ibid., p. 12.
49 Ibid., p. 9.
50 Ibid., p. 17.
51 Ibid., p. 23.
52 Ibid., p. 30, 63.
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the functioning of this paradoxical logic in the third chapter, stating that 
“omnivoyance, Western Europe’s totalitarian ambition, may here appear as 
the formation of a whole image by repressing the invisible.”53 Everything and
everyone now must be subjected to the violence of illumination. Interestingly, 
Virilio suggests that famous philosophers like Lacan, Foucault, and Barthes, 
all admitted to a sensation of terror in relation to their “obsession with the 
un-said going hand-in-glove with a  totalitarian desire for clarifi cation.”54
Virilio terms the new media technologies’ propensity for instilling terror 
by falsely propagating progress modern society’s “Medusa Syndrome.” Th is 
syndrome was fi rst unleashed in the 19th century on the lower classes and 
the colonised peoples, and now comes to hit home in the location where it 
was fi rst conceptualized: Western academia.55 What we therefore live today,
both inside and outside the university walls proper, is according to Virilio 
the “technological outcome of that merciless more light of revolutionary 
terror.”56 We indeed notice here the fundamental relationship between aca-
demia’s role in incessant capitalistic productivity and its twin companions 
of hope and fear by way of a new tyranny of transparency. Th e compulsion for 
the performance of intellectual optimism incessantly functions to cover over 
the sense of terror that the neo-liberalisation of the university via new media 
technologies has subjected their staff  (and of course many other groups in 
contemporary society) to. Th is is also to stress again that any solution to this 
situation can and should not lie in “protecting” the university’s function-
ing from this onslaught of neo-liberalisation. Th is aft er all would not only 
temporarily protect merely the intellectual classes from this economic logic, 
but would also disregard the ways in which the university has been involved 
in the acceleration of this onslaught that was unleashed on the dispossessed 
classes by way of their “total illumination” via census-taking, the statistical 
social sciences, and fi nally the hooking up to electronic databases, as in the 
case of the NSE.
Th e penultimate chapter of Virilio’s book titled “Th e Vision Machine” 
(as if now signalling the crux of its analysis), deals with the state of scien-
tifi c and philosophical enquiry in our current era that is saturated with the 
technologies of seeing and discerning. Th e chapter presents the reader with 
a distinct change of style: while the previous chapters were more in a clas-
53 Ibid., p. 33.
54 Ibid., p. 34.
55 Ibid., p. 42.
56 Ibid., p. 44.
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sically descriptive style, this fi ft h chapter contains more of the rapid-fi re 
eff ect of all caps and quasi-conclusive statements. It is almost as if Virilio the 
teacher starts rambling and disintegrating. Th e style, I suggest, emulates the 
“logistics of perception” today in which the reader, researcher, or spectator 
is “bombarded” with techno-scientifi c propaganda, but it is also a style that 
seeks to forego a dominant mode of philosophical reasoning. I read Virilio’s 
fi ft h chapter as an illustration of how the unknowable aspect necessary for 
any type of knowing does perforce return in the assumptions, concepts, and 
axioms of modern science and philosophy. Th is is because it is in these that 
the auto-immunity of the university project shows itself despite (and due 
to) its totalitarian and omniscient ambitions. Virilio is therefore, I suggest, 
illustrating how hope and despair – just like control and accident, as well as 
the visible and the invisible – are fundamentally immanent to one another.
It is perhaps due to the fact that Virilio’s works mirror our own terror that 
they are unpleasant texts; but their main use, I propose, is precisely that they 
seek to invoke some kind of libidinal “resistance” or rebellion I also hope-
fully note in some of my students. Digital technologies for Virilio bizarrely 
create a “sightless vision,” in which the exceeding cutting-off  from the sub-
ject’s mnemonic capacities in turn creates an obsession in modern society 
with “fore-seeing” or prediction via computerized quantifi cation.57 It is such 
“fore-seeing” that seeks to close off  the possibility of the unknown returning 
in the near-future, while paradoxically also producing more unknowability. 
Th is conundrum, I concur with Virilio, thus signals the fact that subject and 
object have always existed in a dialectical relationship. Th erefore, the teach-
ing scene contains an amount of dislodgment and trickery that for instance 
Descartes sought to banish via an idea of a god that would not mess with the 
senses, simply claiming that “God is not a deceiver.”58 But the very attempt 
in the sciences and humanities to erase uncertainty via the accumulation 
of knowledge that follows as well as generates its fundamental theories 
therefore eventually exacerbates uncertainty and violence. It is therefore the 
“automation of perception that is threatening our understanding,” and as
a collateral of the totalitarian quest that underlies this threat comes also the
increasingly discriminatory eff ects of such automations.59 And such eff ects
57 Ibid., p. 61.
58  René DESCARTES, “Meditations on First Philosophy: Sixth Meditation.” In Philosophy of 
Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, p. 16.
59  VIRILIO, Th e Vision Machine, p. 75.
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can precisely be noticed in the Dutch NSE and in the auto-immune emphasis 
on “method” at Utrecht University.
A beyond of vision and reason?
To conclude, the central logic of the university today currently also consists 
of a pervasive “stealth” functionality or unknown quality. Th is is a logical 
yet paradoxical outfl ow of the ambiguity of techniques of exposition and 
transparency, and Virilio’s “vision machine” presents us with a  perfectly 
dominant allegory of this situation. Th is is because especially the cybernetic 
technologies that constitute the core techniques of teaching and research 
today fundamentally rely on obscuring or dissimulating their own opera-
tions. Th is in turn segues into the problem that the contemporary university 
ever more hides its internally oppressive operations in favour of a  false 
image of university “objectivity” and of it “being at the forefront” of knowl-
edge, transparency, emancipation, and truth. Th is also becomes apparent 
in the case of the Dutch NSE, where the numerical grade that supposedly 
“objectively” represents the quality of a  programme, is ultimately near-
meaningless. Aft er all, it almost completely hides not only how exactly that 
grade has been calculated, but also how the non-neutrality of the technology 
that facilitates the calculation of such a number gets dissimulated. Th e NSE 
thus normalizes – poor students who assume that their vote is empowering
– grade-based systems of hierarchisation. Due to this stealth logic, a stifl ing 
“productivist” principle reigns in most contemporary universities. Th is 
principle relegates everything or anyone that does not comply as undesirable 
or incomprehensible, as some of us in the humanities or theoretical sciences 
can attest to. It is this situation that logically gives rise to aggravated tensions 
and schizoid experiences among university staff  and students; but it is also 
this situation that fi nally allows us to expose the hypocrisy of this situation. 
Th e irreducibly unknown or “dark” quality of the university, in the form 
of a sort of libidinal antagonism, pops up with a vengeance in a time where 
one would least expect it. It does this for instance in the teaching scene, 
where in the Dutch case the emphasis on “transparent roadmaps” leads to 
more confusion among students as well as the dissimulation of the extreme 
heterogeneity of and irritated and exhausted staff  and student body. Such 
is the essence of managerialism aft er all; guided by a principle that resides 
inside itself, it will only strengthen this principle whenever it wants to ban-
ish it more forcefully.
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Th is article has argued that the current university and its new forms of 
violence are an outfl ow of “outdated” and ultimately complicit Enlighten-
ment humanist, and even Christian ideals whose auto-immunity has be-
come accelerated by neoliberal capitalism and its machinery of perception. 
Eventually however, the instabilities, accidents, and ambiguities generated 
through this technological acceleration also present an in-appropriable 
possibility and a promise of a radically alternative future for the university, 
if we still want to call it that. All that modern machines, rendering trans-
parent “society” by foregrounding their own increasing ubiquity, in spite of 
everything do, is prove that all theoretical and democratic representation 
is in fact unfair fabrication. Th e NSE is the epitome of this aggravated logic 
of “sightless vision” by providing a  mere decontextualized number, much 
in the vein of how the computer in the infamous Hitchhiker’s Guide to the 
Galaxy concludes with a hilarious “42.”60 Th is baffl  ing situation presents the
contemporary promise of the university, since it is in the rendering visible of 
the fact that it is not founded on anything universally meaningful – namely 
that the Western metaphysical conception of vision, reason, justice, and com-
munication is a scam – that the acceleration of the contemporary university 
presents us with the possibility of a beyond of the neoliberal economy. And
the prime location where this promise emerges might be the pedagogical 
scene, thanks to the fact that its singularity can never, much to some manag-
ers’ dismay, become wholly transparent and predictable.
60 Douglas ADAMS, Th e Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. New York: Random House 1995,
p. 279.
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